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unable to work out equitable apportionment laws in its 93rd session.
Such inaction will be the result of the legislature's inability to mechanically
dispense with its traditional, and heretofore carefully preserved, practice
of fighting out political differences and arriving at an end only with
conscience seared. Those who view the maintenance of separated govern-
mental branches essential for compliance with the intention of our con-
stitutional founders will sympathize with the legislature's philosophical
position, though perhaps be displeased with the result it produces. But
those who find the amenability of the legislature to the judiciary in
political matters essential for the maintenance of responsible government
will be pleased with the ultimate affect that Baker must have on Indiana.
HAS THE RULE OF MacPHERSON V. BUICK BEEN ADOPTED
IN INDIANA?
Indiana presumably has aligned itself with the majority of other
jurisdictions in the assault on the "citadel of privity." The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, interpreting the law of Indiana
in the case of Elliot v. General Motors Corp.,' recently held that privity
of contract is not a necessary element in order to state a cause of action
against a manufacturer and recover for injuries suffered as a result of
the negligent manufacture of a defective product.
The plaintiff in the Elliot case was employed as an automobile me-
chanic by a Chevrolet distributor. The defendant manufactured and sold
an automobile to the distributor who in turn sold it to a consumer. A
short time later it was taken to the distributor for some minor repairs
which required the plaintiff to loosen certain bolts underneath the auto-
mobile. This necessitated reaching through an opening in a splash shield
designed by the defendant to permit access to the automobile engine by a
mechanic. The opening was defectively formed in that it had a sharp
knife-like edge which was concealed from view. Plaintiff's hand slipped
from a wrench with which he was loosening the bolt, came into contact
with the sharp edge of the opening, and he sustained a severe injury to
his arm.
Assuming negligence, since the appeal arose from the district court's
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted, the court postulated the issue as
1. 296 F.2d 125 (7th Cir. 1961).
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whether Indiana had adopted the rule established by Judge Cardozo in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.2 that a manufacturer can be held liable
for the negligent construction of a product irrespective of the lack of
privity of contract. Although the last definitive opinion by the Indiana
Supreme Court upheld the necessity of this traditional requirement before
a suit could be maintained against a manufacturer for negligence,3 the
court was influenced by two later decisions of the Indiana Appellate
Court which approved the MacPherson rule.4 The Court of Appeals felt
that these two cases were significant in expressing the Indiana position
on the privity rule because the Indiana Supreme Court denied petitions to
transfer in each of them, indicating at least a tacit approval of the con-
clusions reached by the Indiana Appellate Court. It was also neces-
sary for the Court of Appeals to deal with a much clearer and more re-
cent precedent when the defendant relied on the case of Gahimer v.
Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp.5 as controlling. This was a Seventh Cir-
cnit case, decided four years previously, interpreting Indiana law as re-
quiring privity of contract in a similar fact situation. The court re-
jected this argument because the Indiana Supreme Court's denial of peti-
tions to transfer in the two appellate court decisions approving the
MacPherson rule was not brought to its attention in the Gahimer case.
It therefore concluded "the rule of MacPherson applies to this case. It
is our conclusion that, under Indiana law, plaintiff has charged actionable
negligence against defendant .... "6
GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PRIVITY REQUIREMENT
The case of Winterbottom v. Wright' established the general rule
that governed tort law in both this country and England for more than
three quarters of a century that absent privity of contract, a contractor,
manufacturer or vendor was not liable for injuries arising out of a de-
fect in an article constructed, manufactured or sold by him. In the
Winterbottom case recovery was denied a mail-coach driver who brought
suit against a man who maintained the coaches for the driver's employer.
The result was based on the absence of any duty owed the plaintiff and
the ensuing undesirable increase in litigation from allowing recovery by
any other than the contracting parties. Articulation of this last reason
engendered the famous dictum of Lord Abinger that:
2. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
3. Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co., 188 Ind. 79, 122 N.E. 1 (1919).
4. Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Williams, 111 Ind. App. 502, 37 N.E.2d 702 (1944);
Holland Furnace Co. v. Nauracj, 105 Ind. App. 574, 14 N.E.2d 339 (1938).
5. 241 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1957).
6. Elliot v. Gen. Motors Corp., 296 F.2d 125, 129 (7th Cir. 1961).
7. 10 M&W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
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if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even every person
passing along the road, who is injured by the upsetting of the
coach, might bring a similar action. Unless we confine the
operation of such contracts as this to the parties who enter into
them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which
there can be no limit, would ensue ... '
Anachronistic as this statement might seem today, in the England
of the mid-nineteenth century, it was a perfectly justifiable statement of
the law since the common law judges were still reacting against the strict
responsibility imposed by the action of trespass for injuries which fol-
lowed as the direct and immediate consequence of a voluntary act.
Moreover, the industrial revolution was still in its embryonic stage with
simple manufacturing processes, face to face dealing between maker
and purchaser, and detailed product inspection by both parties before a
sale was consummated. At this particular date industry and commerce
were thought to need judicial protection in order to be encouraged to
expand.
Although Winterbottom v. Wright became the general rule, courts
soon began developing exceptions which diluted its vigor. One of these
posited liability on a theory of deceit when a seller knew that his product
was dangerous for its intended use, but failed to disclose that fact to the
buyer, and a third person was injured.'" Another exception was recog-
nized when the owner of land furnished a defective chattel for use on
his premises." The plaintiff, generally the employee of an independent
contractor, was considered to have been invited on the premises and so
owed a duty of care.
Thomans v. Winchester 2 marked the first significant breach in the
manufacturer's "citadel of privity." The defendant manufacturer put a
dandelion label on a bottle containing belladonna, a deadly poison, placed
it in the stream of commerce, and a remote vendee was injured. The
court declared privity of contract to be unnecessary when a manufacturer
or seller is shown to be guilty of negligence in connection with a product
which is dangerous by its very nature. This doctrine, known as the in-
herently dangerous product exception, has been accepted by nearly all
8. Id. at 114, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
9. See, e.g., PROSSER, TORTS, 498 (2d ed. 1955); Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts,
50 HARV. L. REv. 1225, 1232 (1951).
10. Landridge v. Levy, 2 M.&W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (1837).
11. See, e.g., Devlan v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882); Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D.
503 (1883) ; Elliott v. Hall, 15 Q.B.D. 315 (1885).
12. 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
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American jurisdictions." Such things as poison, 4 explosives and fire-
arms15 and unwholesome food and drink ' are obviously included within
this category. However, many courts attached themselves to the excep-
tion as a panacea for mechanically solving cases. They were concerned
with whether such items as chewing tobaccol? and saddles 8 fit the classi-
fication of an inherently dangerous product so as to come within the
exception, instead of recognizing that the real problem lay within the
fundamental concepts of negligence. In other words, one who prepares
and sells food, drugs, and explosives is engaging in activity which is
likely to cause serious harm if mismanaged even slightly. Furthermore,
the defect cannot ordinarily be discovered through an ordinary inspec-
tion by the consumer. Therefore, there is a duty toward all persons not
to fail to take adequate precautions because under such circumstances a
reasonable and prudent man would anticipate serious injury as a natural
and ordinary consequence of such failure. The nature of defendant's
conduct rather than the type of product involved should be the subject
matter of the court's analysis.
Finally, in 1916, Judge Cardozo, in MacPJwrson v. Buick Motor Co.
"put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the
consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and
nothing else."'" In that case, the defendant sold an automobile to a re-
tail dealer who in turn resold it to the plaintiff. While driving the auto-
mobile, the plaintiff was thrown out of the vehicle and injured when one
of the wheels suddenly collapsed. Subsequent investigation revealed that
the wheel was defectively made, causing its spokes to crumble. Al-
though the wheel was not manufactured by the defendant, there was evi-
dence that the defect could have been discovered by a reasonable inspec-
tion and that defendant had failed to make such inspection. The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff and stated:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to
place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a
13. Russell, Manufacturer's Liability to the Ultimate Consumer, 21 Ky. L.J. 388
(1933).
14. See, e.g., National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1880); Norton v.
Sewall, 106 Mass. 143 (1870) ; Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N.Y. 351 (1870).
15. See, e.g., Weiser v. Halzman, 33 Wash. 87, 73 Pac. 797 (1903) ; Welhausen v.
Charles Parker Co., 83 Conn. 231, 76 Atl. 271 (1910); Peterson v. Standard Oil Co.,
55 Ore. 511, 106 Pac. 337 (1910).
16. See, e.g., Tomlison v. Armour & Co., 75 N.J. 748, 70 Atl. 314 (1908) ; Wood v.
Sloan, 20 N.M. 127, 148 Pac. 507 (1915); Haley v. Swift & Co., 152 Wisc. 570, 140
N.W. 292 (1913).
17. Liggett & Myers v. Cannon, 132 Tenn. 419, 178 S.W. 1009 (1915).
18. Bragdon v. Perkins-Campbell Co., 87 Fed. 109 (3d Cir. 1898).
19. 217 N.Y. 382, 390, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
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thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences
to be expected. If to the element of danger there is added
knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the
purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of
contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a
duty to make it carefully.2"
On its face, the MacPherson decision, which found immediate ac-
ceptance in nearly every jurisdiction in the United States,2 merely ex-
pands the inherently or imminently dangerous exception to privity of
contract beyond the traditional categories of foods, drugs and explosives
exemplified by the cases following Thonas v. Winchester. However,
close analysis of the opinion at least raises the question whether the
privity requirement is not totally abolished in cases involving a manu-
facturer who markets a product defectively made with knowledge that
further inspection by the consumer is highly improbable. To understand
this, it must be remembered that before privity of contract becomes an
issue in any negligence suit, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie
case of negligence. He must show that the defendant owed a duty of
care to a class of persons of which he is a member, that the defndant
failed to exercise the standard of care of a reasonable prudent man, and
that defendant's failure to meet this standard of care resulted in a legal
injury to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff establishes this prima facie case,
it would be difficult to imagine a product that does not meet the test of
imminent dangerousness stated by Judge Cardozo, namely that it is "rea-
sonably certain to place life and limb in danger when negligently made."22
The following statement from Carter v. Yardley & Co.2" is representative
of the several authorities which now state that privity of contract is no
longer a requirement in a negligence action against a manufacturer:
The MacPherson case caused the exception (inherently or im-
minently dangerous products) to swallow the asserted general
rule of nonliability, leaving nothing upon which that rule could
operate. Wherever that case is accepted, that rule in truth is
abolished, and ceases to be part of the law.24
This repudiation of the Winterbottom rule is as correct in result as
it is in its reasoning. The application of the privity requirement is un-
20. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
21. PROSsE, TORTS, 500 (2d ed. 1955).
22. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
23. 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946). But cf., Pears, The God in the Machie,
29 B.U.L. REv. 37 (1949).
24. Id. at 103, 64 N.E.2d at 700.
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workable because of its inherent inability to secure justice in contempo-
rary litigation involving injuries -sustained from defective products. As
stated above, when the Winterbottom rule was promulgated the indus-
trial revolution was just developing. The manufacturer and ultimate
consumer were engaged in constant face to face contact. Most products
purchased were not complex and were subject to an intelligent inspection
by both middleman and consumer. Moreover, this inspection was antici-
pated by all parties concerned. The contrast in manufacturing and mer-
chandising between that era and today is staggering. Now even the
simplest household appliance requires immensely complicated manufac-
turing processes. The same mechanical, electrical and chemical sciences
that have so greatly raised the standard of living have also multiplied the
possibilities and the seriousness of injury if the products created by these
sciences are defectively made. Distribution has also become more com-
plex. Products are shipped from one section of the country or part of
the world to another, often passing through the hands of a score of
middlemen. Inspection is no longer anticipated, nor is it possible in the
thousands of products that come directly packaged or bottled from the
manufacturer. Added to this is the constant barrage of mass media adver-
tising urging consumers to rely on the quality of trade-marked products.
Considering these factors, it is difficult to conceive of a rule in a
modern industrial society that would not impose liability for injuries
caused by defective manufactured products within the realm of fore-
seeable harm. The manufacturer finishes the products, turns it over to
a wholesaler who in turn passes it on to a retailer who sells it to a con-
sumer. The consumer is the person who suffers the injury if the pro-
duct is defective but he rarely has a contract with the manufacturer. On
the other hand, the wholesaler or retailer who is in privity of contract is
rarely hurt. The manufacturer has the best and many times the only op-
portunity to inspect the product thoroughly. He presumably receives a
fair price for it and is able to spread the cost of protecting himself against
consumer injury over a large quantity of goods sold. Therefore, it is
certainly desirable to hold him to the same standard of care that other
individuals must adhere to in dealing with society.
INDIANA HISTORY
The first Indiana case dealing with the privity requirement was
Daugherty v. Herzog.2" While walking along a sidewalk, plaintiff's de-
cedent was killed when a building collapsed due to the negligence of the
25. 145 Ind. 255, 44 N.E. 12 (1896).
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defendant contractor in fastening the beams and ironwork. The court
held for the defendant on the ground that, after the repairs had been
completed and accepted by the owner, a contractor owed no duty of care
to anyone other than the party for whom he had done the work; the
owner was considered an independent intervening cause breaking the
connection between the negligence and the harm.
A manufacturer's liability for defective products, absent privity of
contract, was first considered and disclaimed in the case of Laudeman v.
Russell.2" Plaintiff's decedent was killed when a defective boiler, which
his employer had purchased from the defendant, exploded. Although an
exception to the rule of no liability without privity was recognized in the
case of an inherently dangerous article within the limits of Thomas v.
Winchester, or when the manufacturer was guilty of deceit, the court was
unwilling to extend the inherently dangerous category to things other
than food, drugs or explosives.
So it seems, as of 1909, liability absent privity of contract in Indi-
ana resulted only from negligence by a manufacturer or contractor when
he actually knew of the defect in the product or structure and failed to
disclose it, or as a result of the sale of an article which could come
under the Thomas v. Winchester exception.
Ten years later the citadel of privity reached its high water mark in
Indiana with the case of Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co." The Indiana
Supreme Court held that a man who contracted to build a bridge for a
county was not liable for injuries incurred by a traveler due to its negli-
gent construction after the bridge had been accepted by the county. De-
nial of liability without privity of contract was based on the same theory
as in Daugherty v. Herzog; namely that acceptance of the bridge by the
county " amounted to an intervention of an independent human agency
which had the effect of breaking the chain of causation between any
negligence of the contractor and an injury which might occur after ac-
ceptance."2
The idea that the surrender of the work by the contractor and the
acceptance thereof by the owner is the intervention of an independent
human agency breaking the chain of causation and insulating the con-
tractor from the consequences of his negligence is not sound. It is well
settled that intervening negligence is not a cause superseding the original
substandard conduct when the defendant is under a duty to protect the
26. 46 Ind. App. 32, 91 N.F_. 822 (1909).
27. 188 Ind. 79, 122 N.E. 1 (1919).
28. Id. at 82, 122 N.E. at 3.
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plaintiff against it. 9 If a contractor owes a duty of care to third per-
sons before turning the work over to the owner, the latter's failure, many
times justified because of a lack of ability, to make an inspection of the
work is within the risk reasonably to be foreseen by the contractor, and
the contractor's negligence is the proximate cause of the injury regardless
of who is in possession of the structure. A change of possession does
not break the causal chain in negligence cases, and nothing could be more
foreseeable than that the public will be injured by the negligent con-
struction of a bridge.
Also significant to the future development of the law was the court's
dictum regarding the liability of manufacturers for defective products.
Faced with cases in other jurisdictions holding that a manufacturer was
liable when negligent irrespective of contract, the court stated: "The re-
lations involved in such cases are analogous to those in the case at bar,
but they are not identical; and the rules of law which apply, while simi-
lar, in many respects, are not the same.""0
Along with the doctrine of nonliability of manufacturers to con-
sumers with whom they had no contract, a parallel rule regarding con-
tractors also developed from the Winterbottom case. This rule stated
that an independent contractor was not liable to persons with whom he
had no contract for negligently induced injuries occurring after he had
completed the work and turned it over to the owner."'
Accompanying the usual reliance on the Winterbottom rationale of
a wholesale increase in litigation, the limitation of liability in this area
has been justified on the grounds of absence of reliance by the third per-
sons on the defendant's contract,32 the inability of the contractor to ex-
ercise further control over the completed work after acceptance by the
contracting party,3" and, as we have seen in Travis, the intervening neg-
ligence of the owner in maintaining the dangerous condition which pre-
vents the contractor's negligence from being the proximate cause of the
injury." This latter thesis was also the rationale of Ford v. Sturgis,"
generally conceded to be the leading case in the area, which also made it
clear that the MacPherson case was restricted to manufacturers of
chattels.
Exceptions to the rule are as many and varied as when a manufac-
29. See PROSSER, TORTS, 268 (2d ed. 1955).
30. 188 Ind. 79, 84, 122 N.E. 1, 5 (1919).
31. Larrabee v. Des Moines Tent & Awning Co., 189 Iowa 319, 178 N.W. 373 (1920).
32. Cunningham v. T. A. Gillespie Co., 241 Mass. 280, 135 N.E. 105 (1922).
33. Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70, 21 Atl. 244 (1891).
34. 188 Ind. 79, 122 N.E. 1 (1919).
35. 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
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turer and a product are involved. These include liability when the con-
tractor has actual knowledge of the defect, 6 when his activities create
a public nuisance,37 when the work done or structure built is, when turned
over to the owner, inherently dangerous,8 and finally, liability on gen-
eral negligence grounds."0
It is self-evident from the reasons for and exceptions to the rule
that there is little analytical difference between it and the manufacturer
limitation, and realistically, its independent existence can probably be
attributed to the common law propensity to dignify any legal situation
pertaining to real property. However, it must be pointed out that struc-
tures, such as houses or bridges, are more thoroughly inspected before pur-
chase or acceptance than are most chattels. Also, in the case of structures,
usually the only persons involved are the owner and the contractor where-
as in products there is often times multi party distribution which makes
the ascertainment of actual fault more difficult.
Repudiation of privity of contract as a defense available to a con-
tractor in an action for negligence is nevertheless bolstered by sound
arguments. Dean Prosser" favors the extension of liability because
(1) the contractor, for his own economic benefit, is engaged in affirma-
tive conduct which may affect others' interests; (2) injury to those who
come in contact with the finished work is to be anticipated if it is negli-
gently done; and (3) the owner's reliance on the contractor may be
expected to endanger others by preventing him from taking precautions
for their protection. Additional public policy reasons that can be sug-
gested supporting such a result are the availability of an additional de-
fendant who can greatly eliminate such injuries by using greater care in
construction, plus the fact that the contractor can absorb the costs of
liability insurance into the expenses of operation and pass these costs on
to the public.
After several Indiana cases4 had imposed liability on a manufac-
turer or vendor within the boundaries of the Thomas v. Winchester ex-
ception, accepted as law in Indiana by Daugherty v. Herzog, a signifi-
cant inroad on a contractor's immunity was reached in Holland Furnace
Co. v. Nauracaj."  The defendant installed a furnace in plaintiff's dance
36. Note, 22 MINN. L. Rav. 709 (1938).
37. O'Brien v. American Bridge Co., 110 Minn. 364, 125 N.W. 1012 (1910).
38. See cases collected in 41 A.L.R. 8 (1926).
39. Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1948);
Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
40. PRossER, TORTS, 518-19 (2d ed. 1955).
41. Ft. Wayne Drug Co. v. Flemion, 93 Ind. App. 40, 175 N.E. 670 (1931);
Standard Oil Co. v. Robb, 85 Ind. App. 21, 149 N.E. 567 (1925).
42. 105 Ind. App. 574, 14 N.F.2d 339 (1938).
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hail pursuant to a contract with the tenant in possession. The installa-
tion was completed and the work was accepted by the tenant. When the
first fire was built in the furnace, considerable damage was caused by
the building catching fire due to negligent installation. Despite defend-
ant's contention that there was no liability without privity of contract, a
judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. The court sidestepped the Travis
precedent by pointing out that there was a public contract involved in
that case,43 concluding: "A contractor continues liable (after acceptance
by the contracting party) where the work is turned over by him in a man-
ner so negligently defective as to be imminently dangerous to third per-
sons." 
4
This case has been cited for the proposition that the inherently
dangerous exception was merely extended,45 but it clearly rests liability
on negligence alone. This is apparent by its use of authority, and the
phrasing of the sentence ". . work is turned over by him in a manner
so negligently defective as to be imminently dangerous to third per-
sons." 46  It is plainly a misinterpretation to regard this as imposing
liability only when inherently or imminently dangerous things are neg-
ligently constructed instead of imposing liability for an article which is
inherently or imminently dangerous because it is negligently constructed.
Thus, by predicating liability on the nature of the foreseeable harm in-
stead of on the nature of the product or article, or the existence of a con-
tract, it would seem that a contractor's liability in Indiana is to be based
on general negligence principles regardless of privity of contract. How-
ever, the facts and reasoning of the decision indicate, reinforcing the
Travis distinction, that only the liability of a contractor was at issue and
the case cannot be extended to manufacturers of chattels.
Privity of contract with regard to the product liability of manufac-
turers again came under attack in Indiana in Coca Cola Bottling Works
v. Williams" In an action for injuries caused by drinking a bottled
beverage containing concrete chips, the court affirmed a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff nothwithstanding the lack of privity in the fol-
lowing words:
The rule now in the best reasoned cases is that the manufacturer
of foods or bottled goods sold for human consumption may be
43. This distinction is tenuous since it does not appear that the holding in Trazis
rested in any way upon the fact that a public contract was involved.
44. 105 Ind. App. 574, 580, 14 N.E.2d 339, 344 (1938).
45. 24 IND. LJ. 289 (1939).
46. 105 Ind. App. 574, 580, 14 N.E.2d 339, 344 (1938).
47. 111 Ind. App. 502, 37 N.E.2d 702 (1944).
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held liable to the ultimate consumer for injuries caused by
foreign deleterious substances in such goods, regardless of
whether or not there was privity of contract between them.4"
Although MacPherson v. Buick was cited with approval by the court,
the actual decision is questionable authority for the conclusion that the
rule is now applicable in this state. The difficulty in viewing the deci-
sion in this light results from the realization that the case would have
been decided the same way regardless of MacPherson. The exception
to the requirement of privity of contract for products manufactured and
sold for human consumption such as food and drink, had been recognized
since Thomas v. Winchester some ninety years before. Indiana had long
approved and followed the exception49 and many other jurisdictions had
applied the principle to facts almost identical to those involved in the
Williams case."0
Following this decision, there has been one important federal case
which attempted to interpret Indiana law regarding the necessity of
privity of contract in a negligence action. This case, McCloud v. Leavitt
Corp.,"1 involved a contractor's liability for defects in construction. The
court, relying on the fact that the Indiana Supreme Court denied a peti-
tion to transfer in both Holland v. Nauracaj and Coca Cola Bottling
Works v. Williams, decisions believed to approve the MacPherson rule,
determined that this meant the Indiana Supreme Court also had accepted
the MacPherson doctrine with regard to the liability of contractors.
Without analyzing the soundness of such a conclusion at this time,
it is still important to recognize that the McCloud case involved only the
liability of a contractor and cannot control cases involving a manufac-
turer's product liability. It is obvious that Judge Lindley recognized this
distinction since he concurred in a majority opinion of the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit nine years later which held that a manu-
facturer of chattels was not liable to one with whom he was not in
privity of contract. 2
RATIONALE OF THE ELLIOT CASE
It was seen above that the instant case, Elliot v. General Motors
Corp., was decided for the plaintiff because the Indiana Supreme Court
had denied petitions to transfer in both Holland Furnace v. Nauraca] and
48. Id. at 506, 37 N.E.2d at 706.
49. Daugherty v. Herzog, 145 Ind. 255, 44 N.E. 12 (1896).
50. See, e.g., Jackson Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864, 64 So.
791 (1914) ; Boyd v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S.W. 80 (1915).
51. 19 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Ili. 1948).
52. Gahimer v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp. 241 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1957).
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Cocc Cola Bottling Works v. Williams, cases which are thought to hold
that privity of contract is not an essential element in negligence actions.
Such denial was assumed by the court to have stamped the tacit approval
of the Indiana Supreme Court on the MacPherson rule; thereby express-
ing the Indiana law on the subject in an indirect but controlling manner.
The fact that the Indiana Supreme Court denied a petition to trans-
fer in these two cases is not authority for the conclusion that the
MacPherson rule is the law in Indiana regarding manufacturer's product
liability. Although some early cases indicated that a denial of a petition
to transfer under Burns section, 4-215"s was an approval of the conclusion
reached by the appellate court," the Indiana Supreme Court has qualified
and retreated from this broad statement. The first limitation was drawn
in Harter v. Board of Commr's where it was pointed out that the denial
of transfer cannot be regarded as an approval of all that was said
"arguendo" or by way of dicta. A similar cautionary note was injected
in Fardy v. Mayerstein," where, after stating that transfer would be re-
fused if it would not produce a different result, the court said:
Denial of a petition to transfer does not indicate our approval
of all language of the opinion under consideration. Dicta must
be read in relation to the decision. It would be an unnecessary
duplication of effort for us to take over every case containing
loose or even erroneous statements, which when read in the light
of the facts with which the Appellate Court was dealing, are
not likely to mislead courts and lawyers in the future disposi-
tion of cases."
Another difficulty with accepting a denial of a petition to transfer
as a blanket approval of the appellate court's opinion is that while there
may be one or more errors in the opinion, the petition to transfer may
seek a transfer on some other ground which has no merit. Therefore,
the particular point relied upon as precedent in later cases may not have
been presented to the court for determination.
In view of the language in Fardy v. Mayerstein, reliance upon de-
nial of petitions to transfer in Holland Furnace and Coca Cola Bottling
Works as an acceptance by the Supreme Court of a doctrine which they
unequivocally rejected only twenty years previously is tenuous. This
53. IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-215 (Bums 1946).
54. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 169 Ind. 260, 82 N.E. 450 (1907); Indianapolis
Traction Co. v. Isgrig, 181 Ind. 211, 104 N.E. 60 (1914).
55. 186 Ind. 301, 116 N.E. 304 (1917).,
56. 221 Ind. 339, 47 N.E.2d 315 (1943).
57. Id. at 347, 47 N.E.2d at 320.
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is particularly true since the Holland case dealt with contractors and
not manufacturers, a distinction recognized by nearly every jurisdiction,"
and dearly commanded by the opinion in Travis v. Rochester Bridge,
the very decision the Seventh Circuit hold is no longer law in Indiana.
Reinforcing this conclusion is the Coca Cola Bottling Works case where
the Court cited MacPherson with approval, but reached their decision
by excepting bottled beverages from the privity requirement; a proposition
of law that had been accepted in Indiana for some fifty years. 9
CONCLUSION
Even though the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has in-
terpreted the law of Indiana as accepting the doctrine of MacPherson v.
Buick in eliminating the defense of privity of contract in a negligence
action against a manufacturer for injuries sustained through the use of a
defective product, the applicable Indiana decisions indicate the contrary.
The few cases that have arisen involving products that have allowed re-
covery fall within an exception to the Winterbottom rule that has been
recognized since 1852. Moreover, although Indiana law dearly indi-
cates that a contractor may now be held liable for negligence to persons
other than the vendee or owner of the structure without privity, in view
of the fact that for so many years the courts of this state and other juris-
dictions have made a distinction between structures on real property and
personal property, it is questionable whether an analogy may now be
drawn between these two types of defendants. Particularly is this true
when the premise of the opinion in the instant case is built on so slender
a reed as a denial of a petition to transfer by the Indiana Supreme Court.
In addition to the analytical weakness of the decision, its propriety is also
open to question since it is inevitable that future plaintiffs in MacPherson
type situations will seek the federal courts for redress whenever diversity
of citizenship makes this avenue possible, rather than take a chance in
the state courts that the Indiana law is what the federal court says it is.
EUGENIC STERILIZATION IN INDIANA
In the early 1900's the advocates of sterilization for eugenic purposes
began to encourage state legislatures to enact compulsory sterilization
statutes. They contended that through the use of sterilization, the surgical
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